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PANEL TWO: GENERAL DISCUSSION
Mr. Gakunu
I think we all agree that the main aim of trade liberalization in
the context of the GATT is to benefit all countries, developed and
developing. But on the many issues that are the subject of this
conference, it appears to me that the majority of the developing
countries are consumers and not producers of services, intellectual
property rights and investment. My question is: How would you
justify the participation of these countries in the current negotiations?
Considering that these countries stand to gain little or nothing, is it
really necessary to bring these matters within the framework of GATT?
Mr. Richardson
I have some comments which may be helpful. With respect to the
World Intellectual Property Organization there is no question that
one of the reasons the GATT became the focus of these discussions
is because WIPO did not do the job. The WIPO spent a lot of time
addressing issues such as standardizing the formal requirements for
filing patent applications, whether inventors should be named on
those applications, or whether a company can file in its own name.
These things are not unimportant matters, because it is helpful to
be able to file patent applications in countries around the world in
this standard way. But in terms of the impact of those kinds of
concerns on the company's business and on international trade in a
broader sense, they are not going to have any impact. Those were
the kind of concerns that WIPO did focus on; it did a lot of model
law work, most of which proposed fairly low standards. It did not
get into the kind of discussions that are in the GATT now until after
the proposals were already brought to the GATT. They are now
substantially also being addressed in the present harmonization treaty
in parallel discussions, but they are playing catch-up in that area.
I do not see anything in the GATT discussions that detracts from
the existing conventions. Rather, we are supplementing those and I
see no reason why WIPO does not have a role. If it goes into the
GATT it has to be implemented. There is clearly going to be a lot
of development, training and assistance, and clearly WIPO is probably
the agency to play that kind of role. The other major reason is that
there were and are no dispute settlement procedures in the in WIPO,
whereas there are in the GATT. Countries are signatories to the Paris
Convention yet have laws that are inconsistent with the Paris Con-
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vention. There is no procedure whereby that problem has been or
can be addressed.
On another point, referring to the African countries, the lesser
developed countries which primarily import technology, it is quite
clear that countries such as Brazil and Mexico and the so-called newly
industrializing, or "NIC", countries are in a different phase of de-
velopment. Presumably, intellectual property is going to have a dif-
ferent impact in those countries. There is greater need and we have
greater problems in countries like Brazil than we would in an African
country. It is by no means clear to me that if an African country
were to introduce, for example, a patent law that has product pro-
tection and a reasonable term, and the kind of things that I talked
about earlier, that would in any way impede their development. It
may not be particularly relevant at an early stage in their development
but I would like to think that it would encourage that development
and in due course it will become more relevant. This is an ongoing
process.
On the questions of barriers, it seems to me you have to be careful
to distinguish between barriers and legitimate trade. From my per-
spective, trade in my company's drugs means trade that originates
from our company or with the approval of that company. It does
not mean trade by generic copiers of our products and I do not find
that increasing levels of intellectual property protection place barriers
in the sense that barriers are used in the trade concept as I would
understand it.
One underlying principle of patent law is that people have some
sort of property right in their creations, which is certainly the case
in U.S. law. Intellectual property under U.S. law has all the attributes
of personal property. If anybody invested 125 million dollars and
spent 10 years of development with respect to any other kind of
property, personal or real property, and somebody took that property
from them, nobody would have any problem characterizing that
activity. It is characterized as theft. I find it difficult to understand
why people would have the same problem when the property that is
being discussed is called intellectual property. I would not want to
confuse that with what we have described as developmental objectives.
I cannot believe that taking other people's property is to be considered
a legitimate way of achieving development objectives.
Mr. Morford
Let me say first of all that I commend Mr. Gakunu on his pres-
entation; we did not miss the Brazilian Ambassador at all. He did
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a wonderful job of presenting the developing country views, and
much of what he has said I have had the privilege of hearing before
in Geneva on the fringes of negotiations in the GATT. We have a
different interpretation of a lot of the things Mr. Gakunu described
as being the developing country's approach to the GATT negotiations.
The Punta del Este Mandate is one of those, and the idea of going
and looking at existing GATT provisions which he described as being
the developing country approach is something which indeed is in the
mandate of Punta del Este. Also in the mandate is something about
new rules of discipline, and of course we have a lot of fun in Geneva
reading different parts of the mandate and then interpreting them
differently. Unfortunately that does not get anyone anywhere, but
the mandate is subject to any number of different interpretations.
The idea of going in and looking at existing GATT provisions and
clarifying them is something that the group did spend time on, and
there is a GATT report which was prepared by the secretariat de-
scribing the GATT provisions bearing on intellectual property.
There are two kinds of GATT provisions that potentially deal with
or actually deal with intellectual property. One of the general pro-
visions deals with, for example, national treatment, which presumably
could deal with intellectual property; another example of this type
is most-favored-nation treatment. The other provisions are those that
have specifically mentioned intellectual property. They generally do
so not in a manner saying that you should protect intellectual property,
but in a manner saying that you can do certain things necessary to
carry out your intellectual property laws despite what it says elsewhere
in the GATT. For example, Article 20(d) of the GATT is kind of
an exception article.
There is nothing in the GATT per se, however, which requires any
country to have any laws that protect intellectual property in any
particular specific manner at any particular level. That is one of the
problems we have with going back and looking at clarifying existing
GATT provisions. We can clarify as much as we want but we will
not get to any kind of addressing of the trade problem that exists,
because of the lack of intellectual property protection.
One related point is the question of why we should be dealing with
intellectual property in the GATT when intellectual property regu-
lation is something that is a national system done for national purposes
at the national level. I would like to mention that subsidies presumably
are also something that is done at the national level for national
purposes, yet they are something that the GATT has seen to address.
Intellectual property, like subsidies, is another one of these issues
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that, because it has become so important in a trade sense, needs to
be addressed by the GATT, or else the GATT is not addressing the
whole trade situation. If the GATT is going to be excluded from
looking at issues that relate to trade, then the GATT becomes less
and less of an instrument for resolving trade problems and a less
effective institution. The GATT has to look at these new areas and
intellectual property is just one of the new areas. The fact that
intellectual property is administered by nations on a national basis
is true, but as with other things that need international discipline,
there have to be rules and regulations when the problems become
major enough that they need to be addressed by the international
community.
One other thing that came up is the question of whether this
monopoly of patents or intellectual property creates a risk that coun-
tries will not have the benefit of products. This is something that
we hear frequently, and regardless of how many times we have heard
it, we have not found an example of where products were really
purposefully taken away from a country's market and became una-
vailable. It is in the interest of companies that they have products
to sell wherever they can find markets. If there are cases where there
are abuses of monopoly powers-where there is price fixing or failure
to deal-these kinds of abuses are much better addressed by antitrust
law than by patent law. Despite this being brought up, we have not
found the examples of companies withholding products from the
market. I do not know whether Mr. Richardson's company, after
spending 125 million dollars, would go and say to a country that,
"we are not going to sell it to you because we do not want to make
any money." That is not the way the market works.
Afs. Bilzi
Just one brief comment on the development issue. The IPC opposes
including language that would permit developing country adherents
to an agreement to maintain their lower standards of protection for
developmental reasons. The IPC opposes this first, because it implies
that strong intellectual property protection does not further economic
development and technology transfer; the IPC would argue that it
does. Also, the IPC does not want to see a two-tiered system of
intellectual property protection where there is protection on one tier
for developed countries and on another tier for developing countries.
Rather than institute a system of permanent derogations from an
agreement, the Intellectual Property Committee supports a transition
period for developing countries to allow them to bring their level of
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intellectual property protection into compliance with the agreement.
The transition period would allow developing countries time to bring
their level of protection up to the floor created by the agreement as
well as give them time to adjust to any economic dislocations caused
by adherence to the agreement. There are incentives for developing
countries to join the agreement. The discipline provided by an agree-
ment will be an incentive for all countries to join. For example,
signatories will have to exhaust multilateral dispute settlement pro-
cedures which will provide protection to countries against unilateral
actions. Developed country parties could agree to provide technical
assistance to developing countries to encourage them to join an
agreement. While all countries might not become signatories to a
code from the outset, there would be incentives for all countries to
join, including developing countries.
Mr. Morford
There is a difference between the private sector and the U.S.
Government here that I should clarify. The U.S. Government position
as far as whether it is a code or an amendment of the GATT articles
is that we should negotiate the substance of the agreement and we
will decide at the end of the day what form it will take. We haven't
quite come down on that yet.
Mr. Gakunu
The mandate regarding intellectual property is divided into two
stages. The first is the clarification stage and the second is the
framework stage. The developing countries feel that the negotiations
should be limited to the clarification stage. The rest is not considered
to fall within the GATT framework.
The second point is regarding Article 20(d) which I agree does not
oblige contracting parties to undertake any enforcement measures
with respect to intellectual property rights. The article also recognizes
that enforcement measures applied to international trade are more
likely to be restrictive, so therefore GATT itself provides for ex-
emptions from these provisions. But what is now being proposed is
that this should be made the law rather than the exemptions. The
developing countries argue that it is inappropriate to expand the
operation of article 20(d) in this manner.
Finally, the opinion that WIPO has not done its job and that the
Bonn and Paris Conventions are inadequate does not in itself justify
the GATT superseding those conventions. The United States and
other developed countries should see what modifications can be in-
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troduced to those conventions to make them more useful. We should
build on the existing conventions rather than outside of them.
Mr. Wilner
The question of the desirability of protecting intellectual property
rights is not a new one. Countries which, in the past, were not parties
to the Paris Convention system and which may have pirated tech-
nology are now staunch defenders of protection for intellectual prop-
erty.
Another point that is often made is that the protection of intellectual
property rights ought to be a part of the international trading system
under GATT because such protection has a positive influence on the
ability of companies or individuals to trade across borders. If all that
is necessary for inclusion in the GATT system is that the subject
matter have a positive relationship to trade, we would have to make
sure that all aspects of commercial relationships that give rise to
acquired rights, including all sales agreements, also be brought under
the GATT. Such a prospect is intriguing and certainly daunting.
Finally, if, in fact, only certain aspects of trade are to be singled
out for inclusion in the GATT system, one might ask why the
protection of intellectual rights has been selected rather than, for
example, trade-related aspects of access to technology.
Scott Birdwell
It is my understanding that if some of the developing countries
did not infringe patents and violate copyrights, many of their in-
dustries would collapse. In that vein, the developing countries do not
have $125 million to spend on research and development to develop
a new marketable chemical; nevertheless, the industrial countries are
calling for increased protection of the intellectual property rights. It
is like asking developing countries to protect something that they
might never have. My question is, does this increased protection not
condemn the industry of the developing countries to permanent ex-
clusion from competing with the industry of the developed and in-
dustrial countries? The question is put to Dr. Richardson and Ms.
Bilzi.
Mr. Richardson
First of all, Pfizer sells in all of these countries despite the varying
degrees of patent protection. We do whatever we can to enforce our
patent rights. We have a very vigorous program of patent infringement
litigation throughout the world and our policy is that if there is
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infringement, we will take legal action to prevent it. We have a lot
of difficulty in enforcing our rights.
The mere fact that sales of our products by other companies goes
on does not mean that the stealing of our rights should be allowed
to continue. I do not see that because they do not have the ability,
that justifies taking it from somebody else.
The theory of intellectual property, of patent law, is that it will
help countries get to the point where they have the ability for them-
selves by providing its incentives for innovation and investment in R
& D. They will develop the ability. My patent is supposed to prevent
somebody from selling one particular product or class of products
covered by that patent. As I pointed out earlier, this is not done in
a vacuum. It is not the only product that will fulfill that purpose.
There are usually many products to choose from. Others are excluded
only for a limited period of time. In my industry, that means that
if you wait five years after I have introduced it, you are free to use
it and there is nothing that I can do, because the patent will have
expired. That is hardly denying them the benefit of the products.
The way it is supposed to work is that you disclose your invention
to the public. The public gets the benefit of the teachings of your
patent and the products that are embodied in that patent. People in
countries throughout the world get the benefit of that. They go on
and do their own research. To the extent that they are blocked by
an important patent held by my company or somebody else, they do
their best to invent around it. They develop their own technology.
Clearly you are correct that at early stages of development, people
do not have the education, scientific expertise and the money to
develop a research based pharmaceutical industry of the type that
we know today in the United States, in Europe, and Japan. But
again, I do not see how that justifies violation of other people's
rights and I see it as an incremental development process. I do not
think that anybody thinks that if they put these laws into place, all
of a sudden they are going to be developed countries over night, but
it is one small step that if you go through the process ultimately they
will get there.
Scott Bi'dwell
My point is that the industry of the industrial countries is so far
beyond the capacity of the industry of the developing countries that
it seems unlikely that the industry of developing countries will be in
a position to spend $125 million to develop a product to compete
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with a company like Pfizer. How long are you asking the developing
countries to hold off, and is it worth the wait?
Mr. Richardson
Obviously that goes with the whole social and economic under-
pinnings of the country and the system they choose to adopt. There
is no reason why what I called stealing should be allowed to continue.
I do not see that you can justify stealing as a means of promoting
development. Everything is not going to be on equal footing; that
is reality and it will take a long time to change, but I am not sure
what alternatives there are. What are generally accepted as violations
of intellectual property laws should not continue.
Mr. Wi/ner
Dr. Richardson, the question is: Whose intellectual property law
we are talking about? The United States has intellectual property
laws that protect certain knowledge and products such as pharma-
ceuticals. Another country might consider that pharmaceutical tech-
nology is knowledge that belongs to society in general; thus, it will
allow anyone who gets hold of the information to use it in the public
interest. While that country will surely have certain regulations on
the production of pharmaceuticals, it will not protect private property
rights in the technology used. The policy decision will have been
made that no pharmaceutical products, whether produced by for-
eigners or by nationals, can enjoy industrial property protection. My
point is, that in the extreme case, what amounts to stealing according
to the public policy of one country may be strongly approved in
another country.
In certain countries, local producers in certain industries would have
to rely on something other than patents and trademarks for market
protection. They would have to depend on the reliability of their
product over a period of time, or, as Coca Cola does, they might
rely on a trade secret. As long as we think of the protection of rights
in technology solely in terms of traditional property rights, there will
be conflict. Views on the nature and extent of property rights to
knowledge vary; what is a property right in one country is not so
in another. Ms. Bilzi advocates a global uniform set of policies which
would specify the widest array of property rights in intellectual prop-
erty. I believe that many countries will resist a uniform approach
and will prefer to maintain their freedom of action to fashion their
own rules, particularly in the pursuit of specific social policies.
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Mr. Richardson
That is obviously the problem, and that goes to the whole concept
of minimum standards and to the remark that I made earlier that
an underpinning of intellectual property law is that people do have
some sort of inherent right in creations. That is embodied in national
legislation. The United States says that you do, and that if somebody
tries to take it from you, then that is infringement and you have a
right to prevent it. Obviously, U.S. law does not apply to other
countries. The point is, that if you accept the patent system and if
you accept it as a principle that people do have a property right,
then the fact that some countries choose to legislate so that things
that we would call theft are conveniently not defined as theft and
so that it is therefore okay to use another's invention, this fact merely
begs the question. Which comes first?
In terms of countries legislating and being free to legislate in this
way, if you take your proposition to the extreme, it means that there
will be no more development of new drugs because we have to get
the returns somewhere. If every country says medicines are very
important and everybody ought to be able to get hold of them at
low prices and anybody is free to make any drug, then there is no
incentive for anybody to take the time and spend the money to
develop the drug. The principle of the patent laws is to provide some
reward at the end of the day as an incentive for people to develop
their inventions.
In the real world, where some countries provide that protection
and others do not, the effect is that the countries that do not provide
the protection are getting a free ride at the expense of the innovator
who loses sales, and at the expense of those countries that do provide
the protection. We have to operate on a basis where the costs of
our businesses are going to be passed on to the consumers. If every-
body is looking for a free ride, that is going to destroy the whole
system. There has to be the incentive in there. That is the very
underpinning of the patent law. If you want to question that premise,
then you are moving towards a totally different economic system.
Even all of the communist countries have some form of intellectual
property laws. We take out protection in communist block countries.
We have had very little experience in enforcing those patents, but
they honor the patents in the sense of dealing with the person that
owns the patent rather than others.
Pharmaceuticals is obviously one of the more difficult areas to
discuss. Nobody can question that there are concerns that go to the
[Vol. 19:2
TRADE CONFERENCE
provision of medicines. I do put to you, as I did before, that the
patent law is not the place to deal with those concerns. The purpose
of the patent law is to promote innovation. People who innovate
will reap the benefits of the patent system. It is not going to happen
overnight, it is going to be a slow process. The experience is that it
works.
AfM. Gakunu
I want to share the following viewpoint. Developing countries are
not saying that they want to be pirates of property rights. Let me
put it this way. Suppose a country like Zimbabwe has a special
arrangement with a firm in the U.S. on property rights in its country.
Should that arrangement be extended to all firms? The MFN standard
would require that once one reaches such an agreement, that ar-
rangement should be extended to all firms. I am raising this question
because it is those kinds of considerations that the developing coun-
tries feel are not being taken into account. In most developing coun-
tries it is not firms that are dealing with the question of intellectual
property, it is the governments. When the government decides to
reach an agreement with the firm or another government, it does not
feel obliged to extend the terms of this agreement to countries with
which it has had no dealings. That is where the problem arises. It
is not so much a question of pirating patents, because these countries
that I represent are unlikely to use this technology without the as-
sistance of the person or firms that produced it. They do not feel
that once they reach this kind of arrangement, it should necessarily
be extended to every other firm or every other country.
Todd Kocourek
If I might steer the discussion away for a moment from questions
of natural right and morality. I wonder if the speakers could speak
more specifically on the economic benefits which they have briefly
alluded to that would result from an adoption of this system of
intellectual property protection on the part of the developing coun-
tries. I ask that because it was my impression that multilateral agree-
ments like the GATT arose not out of a system of natural rights but
out of nations' perceptions of their own long-term self-interests.
Mr. Morford
As Mr. Richardson said, one of the purposes of a patent system
is to encourage innovation. The wider the patent system is, presumably
the more it will do to encourage innovation. If all the nations in the
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world were to protect intellectual property, presumably the incentive
would be better than if nations here and there protected intellectual
property and pirates were allowed to copy in other countries. In that
perspective, as an economist, you would look at it on a social or an
economic welfare model. Certainly the idea of having common stan-
dards worldwide would be better for the whole world because the
level of inventiveness all over the world would presumably be in-
creased.
That does not answer your question about developing countries.
Mr. Gakunu is correct in pointing out that developing countries cannot
be looked at as one block for purposes of intellectual property and
what effect it will have on their development. Certainly as far as we
are concerned, if you look at countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea,
and India you are looking at countries with well developed infra-
structures, high levels of educated people, countries that are capable
of competing across the board in different levels of technology. The
fact that India and Brazil are the two leaders of opposition to this
in the GATT is a little bit confusing to us because they are at that
level where they should want to be taking a different position.
If you look at Brazil, for example, in the information sector where
they are attempting to self-develop, they have essentially cut them-
selves off from foreign technology and have stagnating industries.
By not allowing the technology in, by not protecting the technology,
their own firms cannot get the boost that is needed from the dynamism
that results from being open to the rest of the world. Technology
flows. If it does not flow to you, it is hard for you to keep up with
what is going on elsewhere. There is probably not any country or
any company in the world that can rely upon its own creativity and
innovation to keep itself ahead of everyone else. It has to look and
see what's going on elsewhere. Having a good intellectual property
system helps in that. Intellectual property systems also require in-
ventions from around the world to be disclosed in the local language.
Patents are open to the public. This allows you to look at it, find
out what it is, invent around it. That is the kind of thing that many
inventors find to be helpful.
The question is how much money is it worth to have an intellectual
property system? I do not think anybody can answer that. Economists
have been slow to really come up with economic models or empirical
studies to conclude how much it is worth. There have been some
studies done on the amount of growth percentage for example in the
United States from the beginning of this century until now that came
from technological innovation as opposed to population growth or
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other factors. The rates range from 40 to 90 percent of the growth
in the United States that is due to technological innovation. That is
pretty high. I do not think that you will find that it is any less for
developing countries.
Another interesting study compares social gain versus private gain.
In other words, what does the patentee, the person who has patented
an invention, gain from his invention. How much does he get back,
versus how much does society gain in better products, lower prices,
better standards of living, etc. The study finds that the private rates
of return were very much smaller than the social rates of return.
Even with the extra rights given to inventions protected by the patent
system, the private rate of return was only a small percentage of
what society gained as a whole from the innovations. There is social
benefit for all from encouraging innovation.
For developing countries, the technology transfer aspect is perhaps
the most important. If you have intellectual property protection,
companies are much more likely to have licensing agreements and
share technology. This is not just the patents. It may be much more
valuable to have the know-how that goes with the patent rights. If
you do not have intellectual property protection for a widget, then
companies in that country can try to copy any widgets that are made
elsewhere, any of the newest designs of widget making. But they may
not know how to do it. You may see what a widget looks like in
the patent specs, but you also have to find out how best to make
it and how to make it work. That technology is missing. If you
license that technology you can get the know-how in addition to the
patent rights. But is a local industry in a developing country without
adequate intellectual property protection willing to take that risk of
buying technology if it knows that somebody else can go and freely
copy? It has no legal right to protect its licensing investment. Thus,
there is a question of whether an indigenous businessman will even
try to get that transfer of technology if he does not have protection
in his own country. There are a lot of reasons why it might make
sense economically for developing countries to protect intellectual
property.
But we have been talking about the Mexicos and Brazils, not
countries, frankly, that could not, as I mentioned earlier, put 125
million dollars into developing a new pharmaceutical product. By the
way, not even all pharmaceuticals take $125 million dollars to develop.
As we have seen in history, technology jumps from country to country
and place to place, so it may be Brazil (or in Africa or Asia) where
the next breakthrough comes. But for those countries that do not
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have the level of infrastructure education facilities, the stimulus to
local invention may not seem worth the administrative costs of an
intellectual property system. There is a real role for technical assistance
and aid as far as we can see because clearly there is a cost involved
in administering systems and training people.
Roger Wilson
I have a couple of questions on the developing country point of
view, really more strategic questions than legal questions. For the
purposes of my question let us discard the NIC countries and think
more about the least developed countries. What is the strategy of
the developing countries in their reluctance to raise the standards of
protection for intellectual property? Specifically, do the developing
countries think that the transfer or the licensing of technology will
not diminish if the levels of protection are not increased? Do they
think that this will not really diminish the amount of technology that
is being transferred to the developing countries? If the reluctance of
the developing countries to increase protection does eliminate or
diminish the flow of technology from the developed countries, and
with it the abilities of developing countries to tap this market them-
selves without the technology present, is it thought that these countries
will nevertheless be able to develop the technology on their own more
quickly since there is no protection?
My second question is related to the least developed countries again.
It is my understanding that there is a great need for more labor-
intensive technology and processes in these countries. Is most of the
technology that is being transferred from the West labor-intensive or
is it more capital-intensive? If it is the latter, do we need to proceed
on a single track or is it possible for the developing countries to
provide more protection for technology that they need less (i.e. capital-
intensive technology) and less protection for technology that they
need more (i.e. labor-intensive technology), or is that even a consid-
eration?
Mr. Gakunu
It is a problem, though the answer to your question is very simple.
The developing countries are not avoiding the question of protection
of intellectual property rights. They are saying that GATT is not the
only appropriate framework. They say that there are already existing
conventions for that. There are the Berne and the Paris Conventions,
so why move it from there? What is the purpose of moving it from
there? That is the first point to bring out in the open. It is not a
[Vol. 19:2
TRADE CONFERENCE
matter of refusing protection but rather it is a question of why must
it now be brought up in the context of a multilateral framework?
They feel that they already give protection anyway for the technology,
because if a firm is establishing in Kenya, for example, and Kenya
wants to use the technology of such a firm, then Kenya will have
to provide the necessary conditions and climate for the firm to
establish there. Kenya would be bound to protect that technology.
Thus, the bilateral pressures lead us to protect the property rights
within our national laws.
The second question, with respect to which kind of technology we
are resisting granting protection for, does not arise because we really
have no objection to the protecting of property rights. We question
whether protection must be on a multilateral basis because we do
not see why national laws are not adequate. We do not feel, for
example, that the U.S. laws are more relevant for us than our own
laws. We do not see why protection must be on the basis of U.S.
laws. We wonder why it is that U.S. laws are becoming multilateral
laws, because that is the way we perceive the trend developing. The
U.S. laws may not work in our countries.
Secondly, the argument you are raising against the developing
countries is that we are unlikely to produce that technology so why
should we be involved in the process? What benefit is there for us?
Why must fate be sealed and forced on us? This is tantamount to
saying that if a country is able to develop in the future, it cannot,
because there are already preset rules to follow. Laws, especially
national laws, evolve with time. If we are going to accept multilateral
disciplines, then it means that our domestic lavs cannot evolve, which
we feel is a restriction on us. The developing countries say, look
here, we only want to clarify the competence of the GATT. Let the
GATT deal with those matters with which it has competence. Leave
these other matters to the Berne and Paris Conventions. Therefore,
if there are things that need to be improved in those organizations,
let these improvements be made in those organizations, not outside
them.
Mr. Dogauchi
Will the developing countries agree to change the structure of WIPO
to reflect the concerns that are being expressed in the GATT ne-
gotiations?
Mr. Gakunu
Instead of the United States and other OECD countries indicating
within the WIPO the changes that should be made, they have decided
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to take the issue away from WIPO. It is better to try to see whether
it can be brought into WIPO. Many argue that the WIPO deals with
the developmental aspects of intellectual property and the trade aspects
are coincidental. They are prepared to examine the possibility of those
shortcomings which you said exist, but we are perceived as a burden
that you industrial countries do not want.
The argument made earlier that there is a dispute settlement pro-
cedure does not satisfy the developing countries, since this procedure
is meant for trade in goods and cannot be extended for intellectual
property rights. If you are thinking of a dispute settlement procedure,
then it must be one that is specifically developed for those disputes
that relate to intellectual property. Maybe the dispute settlement
procedures under the Berne and Paris Conventions are not complete.
But why do we have to take them out of WIPO and bring them
into the GATT? Why should we not seek to introduce within WIPO
the changes that we want in that organization? Within the GATT,
it is possible to impose rules on developing countries by using bilateral
pressures on the countries to agree to the new rules on intellectual
property protection. Within WIPO, the bilateral pressures are not as
exacting or as effective as they would be in the context of the GATT.
Maybe that is why the OECD countries are pushing for intellectual
property protection within GATT.
Mr. Wi/ner
I was involved in some work in one of the more industrialized
West African countries. The country wanted to create an institution
to strengthen both the private and public innovative power of the
economy. We looked at the number of patents that had been registered
in the country over a period of years, and in particular, at patents
that concerned manufacturing sectors. In one of the years studied,
a number of patents had been registered; all but one had been
registered by foreign companies. Yet, no manufacturing had been
commenced using any of the inventions or processes that had been
registered.
The country I visited was a member of the West African intellectual
property organization, under whose rules it is easy to obtain approval
of a patent merely by registering it at the central headquarters.
Apparently, foreign companies register their patents to exclude im-
ports and to protect their eventual entry into the regional market at
some future time. Obviously what the country needed was the capacity
to innovate on its own. However, its immediate preoccupation was
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with whether it could sell its raw materials at prices that would keep
its economy going.
I believe that what is needed is a comprehensive system for intel-
lectual property that would foster protection, on the one hand, and
assistance and cooperation in research, development and innovation,
on the other. Support by producers of technology for such a system
would be much more likely to bring about the participation of a
large number of developing countries in an effective harmonization
of the international protection of intellectual property rights.
Concluding Comments to Panel II
Gabriel Wi/ner
The discussions on intellectual property in the GATT are being
undertaken as part of a reworking of GATT rather than a separate
code. The idea of a special code has been replaced by the idea of
something much broader.
The discussion by this panel has highlighted both the conviction
held by proponents that strong intellectual property protection is an
integral part of any successful international trading system for the
future, and the skepticism of others regarding the view that the further
strengthening of intellectual property protection will, in itself, serve
the interests of the entire international community. The debate is
certain to be continued in the current MTNs as well as in other fora.
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